Monday, December 1, 2014

On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral SenseOn Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense by Friedrich Nietzsche
My rating: 5 of 5 stars

We live in a shallow world which is, barring nature, nothing but the manifestation of the superficial lives that people subsist in. A life of dissimulation which is the consequence of smugness, a form of self idolatry resulting from the arrogance which comes from an idea of knowledge; whatever little it is that we know of our, negligible and perhaps insignificant, existence on this tiny planet in a corner of the vast Universe. This little idea is comprehensible on account of human intellect which humans employ in order to survive. This intellect is unfolded into art of dissimulation, into illusions through which they readily deceive themselves. Man lets himself be deceived, thus living a non moral life. But then what it is that strive him to search for truth? It is the need to be accepted socially.

“But at the same time, from boredom and necessity, man wishes to exist socially and with the herd; therefore, he needs to make peace and strives accordingly to banish from his world at least the most flagrant bellum omni contra omnes. This peace treaty brings in its wake something which appears to be the first step toward acquiring that puzzling truth drive: to wit, that which shall count as "truth" from now on is established. That is to say, a uniformly valid and binding designation is invented for things, and this legislation of language likewise establishes the first laws of truth. For the contrast between truth and lie arises here for the first time.

Since such designations are accepted, the misuse of these in one way or other leads to lie. But what people don’t like is not the deception but the unpleasant consequences thereof.

“It is in a similarly restricted sense that man now wants nothing but truth: he desires the pleasant, life-preserving consequences of truth. He is indifferent toward pure knowledge which has no consequences; toward those truths which are possibly harmful and destructive he is even hostilely inclined. And besides, what about these linguistic conventions themselves? Are they perhaps products of knowledge, that is, of the sense of truth? Are designations congruent with things? Is language the adequate expression of all realities?”

Congruent Expressions

When we call an apple “apple”, is the designation congruent? The name of a word causes a nerve stimulation which is transferred into a metaphor (image) and then the image is imitated in second metaphor (sound). So when we hear/call different objects by their names, we are actually talking of metaphors and not the actual entities. The inferences from words , further, is a result of false application and not of truth for if we cared much for truth then there would have been decisive standpoints of certainty instead of subjective stimulation. What is noteworthy here is that since we are aware of objects and their inferences which we gather thereof, as a result of our exposure to them as being concepts which are long held in relation to us or things around, it is difficult for us to think of them as not congruent designations.

Nietzsche says that if we cared much about the truth then there wouldn’t be any need of so many languages. That might be true, but since the languages, from ancient times, have been developed worldwide in accordance with the need of natives of a particular geographical area, it is astounding to think that words developed in different languages for different concepts are not “true” in themselves.

Word as Concept

According to him, word becomes a concept when it doesn’t serve as a reminder of a unique or individual experience but that of different cases which may be similar to it e.g.

“We call a person "honest," and then we ask "why has he behaved so honestly today?" Our usual answer is, "on account of his honesty." Honesty! We know nothing whatsoever about an essential quality called "honesty"; but we do know of countless individualized and consequently unequal actions which we equate by omitting the aspects in which they are unequal and which we now designate as "honest" actions. Finally we formulate from them a qualities occulta which has the name "honesty." We obtain the concept, as we do the form, by overlooking what is individual and actual; whereas nature is acquainted with no forms and no concepts, and likewise with no species, but only with an X which remains inaccessible and undefinable for us.

But can we live on without designating words to concepts? How do we know of the ‘individual’ and ‘actual’ without actually designating words? How can we know of their existence without understanding them in relation to these words? Are we that capable of understanding the ‘X’ without words? If those words are not true, then what else is?

Nietzsche maintains that truth is nothing but- A movable host of metaphors, metonymies, and; anthropomorphisms: in short, a sum of human relations which have been poetically and rhetorically intensified, transferred, and embellished, and which, after long usage, seem to a people to be fixed, canonical, and binding. Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions- they are metaphors that have become worn out and have been drained of sensuous force, coins which have lost their embossing and are now considered as metal and no longer as coins.

Truth in non-moral sense

The society imposes duty in order to exist, which means, to follow accepted metaphors to remain truthful. Morally speaking, this is lying in order to remain truthful to herd, by following fixed conventions. Man lies in accordance with the centuries old habits which in unconsciousness become a part of his rational being. Now this being is controlled by abstractions from which deviation is no longer tolerated and man becomes more comfortable with this known world rather than the perceived world of an individual. This structure of concepts is so articulately categorized that truth can only be found in the accurate sense in the designated category without any violation (strictly belonging to same class and order). For this construction, man can be admired and as far as seeking and finding truth is concerned; it is achieved through an analogy, for man strives to find truth similar to him. What is achieved finally is “assimilation” with the concepts.

But in order to live a moral life which is more meaningful and peaceful, it is necessary for man to forget this primitive world of metaphors and to believe, have invincible faith, that all the objects that are witnessed are “true” in themselves. That they have a meaning which may not necessarily be guided by the analogies man has created. To forget such a world of metaphors/ concepts is not easy, as, even if a man does escape from this, “his "self- consciousness" would be immediately destroyed.” And since these concepts are understood in relation with laws of nature, which we have impressed upon ourselves, it follows that it is us who bring properties to things.

Achieving morality through art

In conjunction with this, it of course follows that the artistic process of metaphor formation with which every sensation begins in us already presupposes these forms and thus occurs within them. The only way in which the possibility of subsequently constructing a new conceptual edifice from metaphors themselves can be explained is by the firm persistence of these original forms. That is to say, this conceptual edifice is an imitation of temporal, spatial, and numerical relationships in the domain of metaphor.

As science is working continuously in the direction of concept/metaphor formation, so is this drive supported by myth and art. Art upsets the known categories of concept by bringing new metaphors, transferences and metonymies so that the refashioned world is colorful, irregular, lacking in results and coherence, charming, and eternally new as the world of dreams.

In this intuitive world, as long as man is able to deceive without injuring, the intellect is free. An intuitive artistic man shatters the old conceptual barriers and lives the life of ‘illusion’ and ‘beauty’ like an ‘overjoyed hero’. The dissimulation he engages in, expresses an exalted happiness. His life is different from that of the rational man’s who live in accordance with foresight, prudence and regularity. Therefore he lives a moral life in that sense.

Whenever, as was perhaps the case in ancient Greece, the intuitive man handles his weapons more authoritatively and victoriously than his opponent, then, under favorable circumstances, a culture can take shape and art's mastery over life can be established.

In essence, Nietzsche here speaks of the brilliance of living an artistic life which makes living more moral in the sense that it has more beauty and charm. An artistic man need not to obey the social conventions of morality but live a life which he considers as "true".



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